To store and process sensitive data related to credit card, healthcare, financial, government which constitutes the big data, Hadoop environment is supplemented with HDFS i.e Hadoop Distributed File System, which is a cloud based, parallel processing, open framework. As the HDFS stores and process critical sensitive data, there is a great need for secure authentication service to authenticate and authorize the user connecting to HDFS. In 2014, Nivethitha et al has proposed first of its kind of authentication service for Hadoop using one time pad. Even though it is a novel attempt, in this paper, we will illustrate that, Nivethitha et al scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and on success of it, an attacker can perform all major attacks on HDFS. As a part of our contribution, we will device a new authentication service for hadoop framework which is light weight and resists all major attacks compared to Nivethitha et al. authentication service while maintaining the merits of their authentication service.
Introduction
The rapid augmentation of online transaction-oriented data, flooding of unstructured data from online social media, exponential evolution of real time data from sensor networks and machine-to-machine communications results in variety of voluminous data collectively called Big data. Big data cannot be stored or processed through conventional storage or processing systems. To cater the enterprise data storage and processing needs, Apache developed Hadoop project which is a java based, open-source framework for distributed storage and processing of enterprise data. In Hadoop framework, all the file storage activities are handled by HDFS i.e Hadoop distributed file system, which can store peta bytes of sensitive enterprise data.
Preliminary security analysis [1, 2, 3, 4] on Hadoop reveals that, to achieve strong authentication and authorization mechanism in Hadoop, there is acute need of secure and cost effective authentication service.
In literature [1, 2, 3, 4] there are four kinds of system architecture has been proposed for authentication service. Single server authentication service, simple multi-server model, gateway augmented multi-server model and two server model. Each architecture is having one or more pitfalls associated with it. Among them two server model is found to be effective [1, 2, 3] . Very few researchers have proposed authentication service for Hadoop framework based on the two server model. Nivethitha et al [1] has proposed a first of its kind of authentication service for Hadoop using One Time Pad. A user password is encrypted with the generated OTP in registration server and transmitted securely to the backend server. Nivethitha et al claimed that their Hadoop authentication service is secure and attack resistant. Sadasivam et al [2] has proposed an authentication service for Hadoop in cloud environment based on two server model, grounded on properties of a triangle, in which the user password separated in two back end servers to resists the attacks.
In these next segments, we briefly review on authentication service proposed by Nivethitha et al [1] in section 2. In section 3, we do cryptanalysis on Nivethitha et al scheme. In section 4, we propose our improved authentication service for Hadoop. In section 5, we scrutinize the security strengths of our proposed framework. In section 6, we do a computation and communication cost analysis on our proposed framework and Nivethitha et al [1] authentication service. Section 7 provides the conclusion of our paper.
Brief review of Nivethitha et al authentication service
In 
Cryptanalysis of Nivethitha et al framework
In this segment, we scrutinize the security strengths of Nivethitha et al [1] scheme, for that we will follow the similar threat model practiced by [3] :
1. An opponent can monitor or eavesdrop or intercept all the messages exchanged between U i and R.S, as these messages are exchanged over public internet. The messages exchanged between registration server R.S and back end server B.S are not accessible to the public as these messages are assumed to be exchanged in private network internal to Hadoop environment. i.e the attacker 'E' is having access to {ID i }, {C3},{OTP * } as these are the messages exchanged between U i and R.S during login stage.
Fails to Resists Offline Password Guessing Attack
An attacker or opponent 'E', as discussed, can intercept the messages {ID i }, {C3},{OTP}. On achieving C3 = E PWi (OTP), 'E' can accomplish the subsequent steps to intercept the U i password PW i : Step1: Guess a password PW g * from a uniformly distributed dictionary.
Step 2: Compute D PWi* (C3) =OTP * , and verify whether OTP * is equal to OTP intercepted. If yes, the U i original password is PW g * else 'E' re run the execution of step1. Once the attacker 'E' guess the correct password, on having {ID i , PW i }, 'E' can login into the system by impersonating U i . 'E'can also successfully decrypt the reply message {C3} sent by R.S to U i during login phase.
Our Enhanced Scheme
In this segment, we portray our proposed scheme. The main rationale of our enhanced scheme is to resist the security flaws set up in Nivethitha et al [1] scheme. 
Security Analysis of Improved Scheme

Resistance to Offline Password Guessing Attack
An attacker 'E', can intercept the messages {ID i }, {C3} and {C4} which are exchanged between U i and R.S over public internet. On achieving ID i * , C3 = h(APW i ) OTP = h(h(a i PW i )) OTP, C4 = OTP * h(ru i ||ID i ). To perform password guessing attack on C3, the attacker must know a i , ru i . But, a i , ru i are random numbers of length 128 bits. Hence, it is computationally impossible for an attacker to correctly guess a i or ru i . Therefore, our scheme resists password guessing attack.
Counter to Replay Attack
An attacker 'E' wish to replay a login message from U i , i.e{C4} to R.S, as discussed in (L6), after every successful login of U i , the random number ru i gets changed. R.S may start processing a replay message from the attacker 'E' and compute C5 out of replayed C4 message and forward {C5} to B.S. On receiving {C5}, B.S searches in its database for {C5}, definitely B.S doesn't find an entry for C5 (C3) in it database. Suppose if it finds an entry, definitely it is not for ID i . (As the replayed message C5, and C3 stored in back end server are computed using different random numbers). Hence, B.S doesn't responds with a valid ID i . Therefore, R.S will reject the login request by 'E'. Hence, we can confirm that our scheme is resistant to replay and impersonation attacks.
Cost and Security analysis
The cost comparison between the proposed user authentication service and Nivethitha et al [1] authentication service, illustrates that our authentication service requires only 15 hash operations compared to 50 hash operations by Nivethitha et al service. As discussed above, our service is very secure and resists all major cryptographic attacks with less computation cost compared to Nivethitha et al scheme. (in which the heavy weight cryptographic operations like encryption and decryption form the major computation force).
Conclusion
In this manuscript, we have analyzed Nivethitha et al HDFS authentication scheme using one time pad (OTP). We have illustrated that their scheme is vulnerable to password guessing attack and on success of it, the attacker can perform all major attacks. To fix these issues, we have proposed a light weight OTP based authentication service for hadoop environment. We have analyzed our scheme in terms of both security front and cost front and illustrated that our authentication service resists all major cryptographic attacks. Hence, we can confirm that, our authentication service is light weight and robust and can be implemented in practical scenarios.
